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AbstrACt
The article will show, through two of Tillich’s lesser-known writings —
the newspaper review articles on the person and work of Rudolf Otto —
that Otto greatly influenced Tillich at a formative stage in his intellectual 
development and that several key elements of Tillich’s mature thought 
are found in Tillich’s analysis of Otto. It will also show, in reference 
to the interpretations of Caird and Palmquist, that Otto’s philosophy 
of religion can be fruitfully understood as a direct extension of Kant’s 
critical philosophy. Furthermore, o author show how the superstructure of 
Tillich’s theology bears a striking resemblance to Kant’s philosophy in the 
sense of Caird, Otto, and Palmquist. Insofar as this analysis is accurate, 
Tillich’s systematic theology is as much grounded on the philosophy of 
Kant as it is on the philosophy of Schelling.
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O que tiLLiCh deve A KAnt: dOis ensAiOs
bibLiOgráFiCOs reCém-trAduzidOs A respeitO 
dA ideiA dO sAgrAdO de rudOLF OttO
resumO
O artigo pretende mostrar, por meio de dois dos escritos mais conhecidos 
de Tillich – as resenhas em journal sobre a pessoa e a obra de Rudolf 
Otto – que Otto influenciou grandemente Tillich num estágio formativo 
do seu desenvolvimento intelectual e que vários elementos-chave do 
pensamento maduro de Tillich se encontram na análise tillichiana de Otto. 
Ele quer mostrar também, com referência às interpretações de Caird e 
Palmquist, que a filosofia da religião de Otto pode ser adequadamente 
compreendida como extensão direta da filosofia crítica de Kant. Além 
disso, o autor mostra como a superestrutura da teologia de Tillich carrega 
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uma estrita semelhança com a filosofia de Kant no sentido de Caird, 
Otto e Palmquist. Na medida em que esta análise é correta, a teologia 
sistemática de Tillich se fundamenta muito mais na filosofia de Kant que 
na filosofia de Schelling. 
Palavras-chave: Tillich, Kant, Otto, Sagrado
 
introduction
A common way of approaching the theology of Paul Tillich is to 
show its relationship to and reliance on the philosophy of Friedrich 
W. J. Schelling. It is common knowledge, for instance, that Tillich 
attributed his theological awakening to his first encounter with the 
writings of Schelling in a bookstore as a university student and that 
Schelling’s work provided a model for how philosophy and theology 
could be synthesized and fruitfully employed to meet the conceptual 
challenges of the 20th century. In reference to his early struggles with 
the doctrine of justification and the inadequacy of strong-handed 
applications of orthodoxy for overcoming them, Tillich writes, “It 
was the work of Schelling, particularly his late thought, which 
helped me relate these basic theological ideas to my philosophical 
development. Schelling’s philosophical ideas opened the way, I thought, 
to an unification of philosophy and theology.”1 Tillich, of course, goes 
on to write two Ph.D. dissertations on Schelling’s philosophical theology 
and apply many of Schelling’s ideas in his subsequent writings.2 No 
doubt Schelling’s work served as the backdrop for many of Tillich’s 
most influential insights. 
1  Paul Tillich, On the Boundary: An Autobiographical Sketch (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1966), 51.
2  The first of Tillich’s two doctoral dissertations on Schelling was presented for the degree 
of philosophy at the University of Breslau and the second was presented for the degree of 
theology at Halle. These were translated into English as Paul Tillich, Mysticism and Guilt 
Consciousness in Schelling’s Philosophical Development, tr. Victor Nuovo (Lewisburg: 
Bucknell University Press, and London: Associated University Presses, 1974); and Paul 
Tillich, The Construction of the History of Religion in Schelling’s Positive Philosophy: 
Its Presuppositions and Principles, tr. Victor Nuovo (Lewisburg: Bucknell University 
Press, and London: Associated University Presses, 1974). These works will henceforth be 
referred to as Schelling’s Philosophical Development and Schelling’s Positive Philosophy, 
respectively.
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In this essay, I want to present the case for another way of 
approaching Tillich’s early intellectual development and its relationship 
to Tillich’s mature systematic theology. My claim is that Schelling 
was not the only “late-Enlightenment” influence of what I will call 
“constitutive significance” to Tillich’s thought. The philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant was, I contend, just as influential, perhaps more so. “In 
my student years,” Tillich writes, “there was a slogan often repeated: 
Understanding Kant means transcending Kant. We all try to do this.”3 In 
Tillich’s earliest work on Schelling, the influence of Kant’s philosophy 
on his student years is undeniable. Victor Nuovo, in summing up this 
influence in his “Introduction” to the English translation of the first 
dissertation, writes, “Tillich’s [Ph.D.] dissertations may be viewed 
as attempts, through Schellingian concepts, to overcome the Kantian 
antithesis of historical faith and moral religion, and to provide a 
metaphysical basis for Kant’s doctrine of radical evil and the self-
estrangement of the autonomous moral will.”4
Kant’s influence on Tillich was surely profound and foundational, 
but was it  such that it  can be what I am calling “constitutive 
significance” to Tillich’s thought in the way Schelling’s is accepted to 
be? In other words, did Kant’s philosophy help form some of Tillich’s 
basic concepts and bring shape to the overall structure of Tillich’s 
thought? My answer to both of these questions is “Yes.” Yet, there is 
a sense in which this answer might rightly be viewed as something of 
a truism or non-falsifiable thesis. One of the distinguishing features of 
the German Idealists generally is that they all saw themselves as the 
true heirs of the best of Kant. They were all in one way or another 
responding to problems left in the wake of Kant and they relied on 
Kant’s writings for intellectual resources for help in resolving them. 
In other words, it is not all that surprising nor is it all that risky to 
suggest that Tillich’s work is likewise reliant on and responsive to 
Kant’s philosophy. If that were my only argument, I would not be saying 
all that much. No “constitutive significance” would thereby be shown.
3  Paul Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology (London: SCM 
Press, 1967), 70.
4  Tillich, Schelling’s Philosophical Development, 13.
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The argument I want to sketch out and defend in brief, however, 
is a little more sophisticated than this and I think does point to the 
constitutive significance of Kant’s philosophy for Tillich’s theology. 
My claims center on another scholar whose work Tillich often writes 
about with a tone and frequency very similar to that of Schelling, but 
who often times gets “the short end of the stick” when it comes to 
aca- demic recognition and study. The person I have in mind, of course, 
is the philosopher of religion Rudolf Otto. In the “Autobiographical 
Reflections,” Tillich writes, “When I first read Rudolf Otto’s Idea of the 
Holy, I understood it immediately in the light of these early experiences, 
and took it into my thinking as a constitutive element. It determined 
my method in the philosophy of religion, wherein I started with the 
experiences of the holy and advanced to the idea of God and not the 
reverse way.”5
This is not the only place where Tillich makes such references to 
the constitutive significance of Otto’s work. We find similar statements 
in the Systematic Theology and in two review articles Tillich wrote 
for German newspapers in the 1920’s.6 The review essays, entitled 
“The Category of the Holy in Rudolf Otto” (1923) and “Rudolf Otto—
Philosopher of Religion” (1925),7 make up the lion’s share of the 
evidence that I will forward in support of my thesis. Tillich’s consistent 
testimony, from the 1920s through to the 1960s, is thus pro-Otto and 
not just in a generic sense, but in the sense of Otto’s work being “a 
constitutive element” and what “determined [Tillich’s] method.”
5  Paul Tillich, “Autobiographical Reflections,” The Theology of Paul Tillich, eds. Charles 
W. Kegley & Robert W. Bretall (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 6.
6  See, for example, Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1951), 215-6.
7  Paul Tillich’s “Die Kategorie des ,Heiligen’ bei Rudolf Otto„ originally appeared in The-
ologische Blätter (vol. 2, 1923, Spalten 11-12). It can also be found in GW XII, Begeg-
nungen: Paul Tillich über sich und andere (Ed. Renate Albrecht (Stuttgart: Evangelisches 
Verlagswerk, 1971), 184-186). The translation is based solely on the original document 
in Theologische Blätter. The second article, originally titled “Denker der Zeit: Der Reli-
gionsphilosoph Rudolf Otto,” was first published in Vossische Zeitung, 1925, Nr. 308. It 
can now be found in GW XII, Begegnungen: Paul Tillich über sich und andere, ed. Renate 
Albrecht (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1971), 179-183. The current translation 
is based solely on the original version in Vossische Zeitung. Nathan Jacobs and I translate 
these review articles in the Appendices of Chris L. Firestone, Kant and Theology at the 
Boundaries of Reason (Aldershot: Ashgate Publications, Ltd., forth- coming 2009).
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In my book, Kant and Theology at the Boundaries of Reason, 
forthcoming from Ashgate in 2009, wherein these two translated articles 
appear in the Appendices, I argue that Otto’s philosophy of religion can 
be understood as good example of the religious interpretation of Kant’s 
philosophy. Stephen R. Palmquist, whose work I will examine in more 
detail below, presents the religious interpretation of Kant’s philosophy 
in his books Kant’s System of Perspectives (1993) and Kant’s Critical 
Religion (2000).8 To the extent that (1) the groundwork for Tillich’s 
theology can be shown to emerge in response to Otto’s philosophy of 
religion, and (2) Otto’s philosophy of religion is best understood as an 
extension of Kant’s critical philosophy under the religious interpretation 
in the sense of Palmquist, then a solid case can be made for a third 
claim—namely, (3) Tillich’s theology is likewise best understood as a 
theological response to the philosophy of Kant. My argument succinctly 
is therefore threefold and these three parts mark out the remaining 
sections of this essay.
tillich in “the Light” of Otto
Looking back at Tillich’s two newspaper articles on Otto provides 
not only valuable insights into Tillich’s relationship to Otto, but also 
a striking look at the seeds of thought that would blossom into some 
of Tillich’s best known theological insights of his American period. 
For thematic reasons, I will focus first on the 1925 essay, “Rudolf 
Otto—Philosopher of Religion,” and then turn to the 1923 essay “The 
Category of the Holy in Rudolf Otto.”
The 1925 essay is the longer of the two and somewhat more 
sweeping in its review of the person and work of Otto. It begins as 
follows:
It was an unforgettable event for me, when, in the fall of 1917, Rudolf 
Otto’s book on “The Holy”—a marvelous early draft, sent from a dear 
woman who had died early—came to me at the camp “Note Erde” on a 
8  Stephen R. Palmquist, Kant’s System of Perspectives: An Architectonic Interpretation 
of the Critical Philosophy (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1993) and 
Kant’s Critical Religion: Volume Two of Kant’s System of Perspectives (Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publications, Ltd., forthcoming 2009).
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high mountain in Champagne. I was taken aback for a moment by several 
oddities in the writing style and the completely unknown publisher. But 
then an amazement began, an internal thrill, a passionate approval, in a 
way one is no longer used to with theological books (RO1).9
Tillich goes on in this article to unpack Otto’s career and thought, 
highlighting Otto’s relationship to the Neo-Kantians in general and 
Leonhard Nelson of Göttingen in specific. After marching his way 
through these highlights, Tillich returns to the significance of Otto’s 
thought for the era:
With this last remark, the intellectual significance of Otto’s thoughts is 
now touched on. They have become for theology a complete breakthrough 
of the wholly other. They have saved the work on theology and 
philosophy of religion from the difficulties of the rational problem, from 
the corruption of logic and ethics. They have created a new foundation 
on which to build, and on which many of Otto’s rivals also build, with 
or without his knowledge” (RO7).
We see in this passage, and in what follows it, not only Tillich’s 
grand appreciation of Otto’s work but also hints regarding its 
significance and those places in Otto’s work requiring further thought 
and development.
Speaking somewhat poetically of himself, Tillich continues, “But 
who, like the author of these lines, has experienced the liberation that 
the book on The Holy has given him; he too can go there, where he 
believes he must proceed to, like for example in the determination 
of the relationship of the rational and irrational, of otherworldliness 
and this-worldliness of the Numinous, in order to not forget the first 
breakthrough” (RO7). This point was already taken up in earnest in the 
1923 essay, which we will get to in a moment, but here serves merely 
as an honorarium to the career of the great philosopher of religion, his 
good friend, Rudolf Otto. The article closes with this remark: “Out of 
9  All citations for “The Category of the Holy in Rudolf Otto” (1923) and “Rudolf Otto—
Philosopher of Religion” (1925) are embedded at the end of the text as paragraph 
numbers—“CH” for the 1923 article and “RO” for the 1925 article. At the time of writing 
this essay, page proofs (with page numbers) for Kant and Theology at the Boundaries of 
Reason have not yet been received.
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devotion to the capturing of the Numinous, [Otto] devoted work to 
practical and theoretical Protestant religious reform. But what is decisive 
and makes him one of the most important figures in contemporary 
theology, is his book on The Holy, for that an entire generation owes 
him thanks” (RO9).
By itself, the 1925 article does not present us with direct evidence 
of Tillich’s reliance on the work of Otto, only the clear indication 
that Tillich read and understood Otto’s work in great detail, openly 
declaring its significance and his adoration for it without qualification. 
In the other review essay, however, the one devoted specifically to 
Otto’s The Idea of the Holy, Tillich is far more forthcoming about 
his intellectual indebtedness to Otto’s work. There, Tillich calls Otto’s 
text “the breakthrough book in the field of philosophy of religion, but 
not only a breakthrough, it has also been the guide for philosophy of 
religion to this day. For those who, like the reviewer, are among the 
first working in the area, and those whose ideas have been influenced 
by this impression, it is a duty to give thanks and testify to the book’s 
beauty and power” (CH1). His purpose in this article is not merely to 
sing Otto’s praises, though he does plenty of that; the purpose of the 
article is, in Tillich’s words, “not to say all this” but to identify “at 
which points of Otto’s book must we take up this great work, and how 
should we build on Otto’s achievement” (CH3).
According to Tillich, the subtitle of The Idea of the Holy—namely, 
On the Non-Rational in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the 
Rational—is only partially realized in the book. The non-rational is 
famously and insightfully explored, but how the non-rational is related 
to the rational was not, in Tillich’s estimation, fully determined (CH4). 
“For this,” Tillich tells us, “you need a critical element in the Kantian 
sense” (CH5). Tillich calls this Kantian critical element “a method of 
critical-intuition” (CH5). According to Tillich,
Otto himself heads in this direction when he speaks of the religious 
disposition and makes the Holy into an a priori category. A religious a 
priori, however, cannot suddenly stand beside the rest of the a priori, 
not even if its content is the “wholly other.” It must be shown in which 
natural relation this “wholly other” stands to the rest of the forms of 
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consciousness. For if it stood nowhere, or even only in an additional 
relation, then the unity of consciousness would burst (CH5).
Here, we find something more than mere enthusiastic adulation 
for Otto’s work; we find the beginnings of a serious philosophical 
engagement. Tillich’s criticism of Otto can be summarized as follows: 
Because Otto turns to “the faculty of divination” as a type of fourth 
realm of reason, Otto in effect amends Kant’s critical philosophy 
by adding to it a fourth a priori standpoint. This standpoint cannot 
suddenly appear, thinks Tillich, for it has no clear critical grounds 
in reason, no intellectual precedent in the great work of Kant. So 
it must either stand nowhere or be an unnatural addition to Kant’s 
critical program. The direction that Tillich maps out to build on Otto’s 
achievement, then, cannot be to understand the faculty of divination as 
a fourth, independent addition to Kant’s critical philosophy, but rather 
to understand it as something more transcendental and ontological, 
something related to reason holistically—more formal than technical.
Tillich’s response to and reliance on Otto’s The Idea of the 
Holy, however, runs deeper than merely relating the non-rational less 
technically and more holistically to the rational in a sense amenable 
to Kant’s critical philosophy. Tillich seizes on the insight that Otto 
“brings to expression…the natural relationship of the Holy… [in] the 
concept of the un-conditioned” (CH6). As a consequence of reading 
Otto, it seems, the concept of the unconditioned be- comes, for Tillich, 
closely tied to the natural human experience of the Holy. Tillich finds 
this idea to be both a breakthrough and an insight in need of further 
clarification and development.
Tillich, in pointing out the strengths and weak- nesses of Otto’s 
position, does not merely accept Otto’s formulation as it stands. He 
continues, “It is not proper that Otto declares this concept to be only 
quantitatively distinct from the conditioned; rather, it contains in itself 
the entire force of the qualitatively ‘other,’ the ‘unfamiliar’” (CH6). 
The wholly other, in other words, is not merely some non-descript, 
mysterious entity that occasionally impinges itself on the religiously 
sensitive members of the human species. The “unconditioned one,” as 
Tillich designates it in this article, or “Being-itself,” as he would later 
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call it, “is so important that I cannot avoid it under any circumstances” 
(CH6). The “wholly other” or the “unconditioned one” lies at the 
ground of all human experience and, in words of the later Tillich, is the 
“ultimate concern” of human beings. “Thus,” Tillich writes, “the concept 
of the unconditioned is not, as Otto states, a pattern of rationalization, 
but an element of the Holy itself” (CH6).
Tillich’s analysis of Otto achieves its full force in the integral 
relationship between the unconditioned one as the source of human 
experience and human rationality as its essential instrument or conduit. 
Here, we find the decisive moment in Tillich’s engagement with Otto and 
why I think there is more than mere regulative significance to Tillich’s 
employment of Otto’s ideas. Tillich writes, “The unconditioned is not only 
a posteriori by schematization, but also a priori by natural relationship, 
which is the foundational element of all value consciousness” (CH6). 
Because human beings are conscious and willful participants in being as 
actuality, the unconditioned has a “natural relationship” to the world in 
and through humanity. Religious experience, as a distinct aspect of human 
experience in general, is in this sense foundational to all experience—it 
is, in Tillich’s words, both a posteriori and a priori, or, put another way, 
it is the product of the transcendental nature of reason understood in its 
phenomenological fullness.10
This is why, I think, Tillich understands the unconditioned as 
something more than the “mystery of Being” in the sense of Otto; it is 
also, as Tillich goes on to suggest, the “mystery of the Light” (CH6). 
Tillich explains, “Being comes to itself in the Light. The unconditioned 
substance and the unconditioned form essentially belong together” 
(CH6). This climactic moment in the essay bursts with meaning, 
alluding to the religious potentiality buried deeply within the very 
rationality that defines human beings (logos) and exemplified ultimately 
in Jesus as the Christ, the light of the world.
10  Otto’s contention that the faculty of divination is sensitive to a “sheer over-surplus” of 
meaning in human experience is not therefore evidence of rational separation, but instead, 
in Tillich’s way of thinking, evidence for this foundational status. Religious experience 
speaks of both the outermost limits human experience and the mystery of human conscious-
ness that makes any experience possible in the first place. All these concepts, interestingly 
enough, are re-confirmed on pages 215 and 216 of the Systematic Theology, vol. 1.
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In sum, we find in Tillich’s review of The Idea of the Holy more 
than just tidbits of his mature work; there is solid meat. We find, first, 
the “unconditioned,” the “unconditioned one,” and the “wholly other” 
as early illusions to the significance of Being-itself; second, we find 
that the unconditioned is “something so important that I cannot avoid 
it under any circumstances” and, equally, the reader cannot avoid the 
important conclusion that this phrase is linked directly to Tillich’s 
later emphasis on humanity’s “ultimate concern”; and, third, we 
find that the unconditioned is not merely the mystery of being in the 
numinous sense; rather the unconditioned one is located at the well-lit 
crossroads of the rational and non-rational within human beings. This 
third point foreshadows the superstructure of Tillich’s mature thought, 
which puts humanity at what Tillich calls the “perspectival center,” 
standing between God and world as the mystery of “Being” turns into 
the “Light.” 11
palmquist’s religious interpretation of Kant
Stephen Palmquist’s interpretation of Kant is significant to the 
Otto–Tillich relationship because of its close affinities with Otto’s 
philosophy of religion and the remarkable way it resembles Tillich’s 
theology. Before we get to these two points in my argument in the 
closing section of this paper, we first need to understand in more detail 
the nature of Palmquist’s interpretation of Kant. His interpretation 
is part of a “new wave” in Kant–studies, which argues that Kant’s 
philosophy is more theologically affirmative than has been traditionally 
supposed. This wave has been gaining momentum over the last 30 years, 
and, recently, has crested in a spate of new books and journal articles.12 
This wave continues to be a major factor in the field of Kant–studies 
today in challenging the standard portrait of Kant as the “all-destroyer” 
of metaphysics in favor of a portrait of Kant bent on establishing 
“rational religious faith” at the transcendental boundaries of reason. 
11 Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 189.
12 For a detailed account of this new wave, see Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion 
and the 2007 Special Symposium Edition of Philosophia Christi.
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In Kant and Theology at the Boundaries of Reason, I present three 
discernable streams of theologically affirmative Kant interpretation—
the moral, poetic, and religious.13 Palmquist’s interpretation provides 
a good example of “the religious interpretation” of Kant.14
Palmquist’s interpretation capitalizes on the often-neglected 
writings surrounding Kant’s critical period. These writings include 
the much-maligned essay “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer” and Kant’s 
posthumous writings known as the Opus Postumum. According to 
Palmquist, when these writings are taken seriously, they present a fuller, 
more complete ac- count of Kant’s philosophical program and show 
that theology can build fruitfully on Kant’s philosophy. Palmquist’s 
interpretation is traceable to the pioneering work in 1889 of Edward 
Caird.15 For Caird, the most natural reading of Kant is likewise four-
fold and holistic. “For the theoretical, the practical and the aesthetic 
and religious consciousness are not really independent things, or the 
products of independent faculties, which stand side by side with each 
other; they are different forms of one conscious life, forms which rise 
out of each other in a certain order determined by the very nature of the 
intelligence.”16 Caird understood Kant’s thought to be a coherent and 
dynamic whole, in which apparent contradictions find their resolution 
in the development and filling out of ideas, rather than in their relative 
demise due to logical inconsistency.
Palmquist argues in a similar fashion that Kant’s philosophy ought 
to be considered less technically and more holistically—as a system 
of three stand- points grounded by one overarching “Transcendental 
13  Tillich, of course, is familiar with all three of these streams of Kant interpretation. In Kant 
and Theology at the Boundaries of Reason, I show how Tillich interacts with the first 
two streams directly from Kant and Kant’s interpreters, and the third stream indirectly 
through Otto.
14  Palmquist accepts the designation ‘the religious interpretation’ in the ‘Editors’ Introduc-
tion’ to Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion.
15  Caird’s two-volume work, entitled The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1889), was 
the first substantial work on Kant in English covering the full extent of Kant’s philosophy 
(including within its parameters Kant’s philosophy of religion). Caird’s interpretation of 
Kant’s philosophy is divided into four “books.” The first three correspond to the three 
Critiques and the fourth addresses Kant’s Religion. Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy 
of Immanuel Kant, vols. I and II (Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons, 1889).
16  Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, 644.
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Perspective.” According to Palmquist, one of reason’s three finite 
standpoints is always operative in human experience, but considered 
as a whole, the overarching transcendental nature of reason delineates 
its true boundaries and employments. As Palmquist writes, “This over-
arching ‘Transcendental (or ‘Copernican’) Perspective’, which is based 
on the assumption that the subject imposes certain a priori conditions on 
the object, defines the systematic context into which all three Critical 
systems fit.”17
Both Caird and Palmquist contend that Kant’s later writings, 
particularly the writings on religion and the Opus Postumum, bring 
into sharp relief a fourth dimension of reason. In other words, a fourth 
realm of human experience—the religious or mystical—arises out of 
Kant’s ‘Transcendental Perspective,” but is not to be considered separate 
from it. The Transcendental Perspective functions as the prereflective 
interface of reason and being at the outer- most frontiers of human 
experience. This ontologically robust understanding of the fourth realm, 
on both their readings, becomes vital to the coherence and completion 
of Kant’s philosophy. We have access to God, and thus can speak and 
think meaningfully about God, as Kant himself often does, because 
reason must finally engage the mystery of being in the world and it 
must do this in accord with its overarching Transcendental Perspective.18
From Kant to Otto to tillich
What we see from the foregoing analysis is that Palmquist’s 
interpretation of Kant is strikingly consistent with Otto’s thought. 
Palmquist highlights this consistency in a 1989 article entitled “Kant’s 
Critique of Mysticism.” He writes, “Rudolf Otto expounds in more 
17  Palmquist, Kant’s System of Perspectives, 58.
18  For Palmquist (Kant’s Critical Religion, 313), “[Kant] not only believed in the reality 
of a transcendent God represented by our theoretical idea, manifested in our practical 
reason (speaking to our conscience), and communing with us in prayer, but also actively 
experienced this reality in his daily life.” On the distinction between the overarching 
(thus, capitalized) Transcendental Perspective that governs all three Critiques and the 
specific (thus, uncapitalized) transcendental perspective operative within each Critique, 
see Palmquist’s Kant’s System of Perspectives (Lanham, MD: University of America 
Press, 1993), II.4.
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detail the implications of [Kant’s] view of religious feeling in [The 
Idea of the Holy].… [I]n fact they are almost entirely consistent.… 
Once the perspectival character of Kant’s thinking is taken into 
account, it becomes clear that he would have no trouble accepting 
such an explanation of his deepest experiences. ‘Reason’ is, for 
Kant, the ultimately unknowable mystery out of which arise all our 
human capacities for knowledge and goodness.”19 Like Palmquist’s 
interpretation of Kant, Otto’s philosophy of religion identifies three 
employments of reason—the scientific, the moral, and the aesthetic. 
More than this, Otto likewise contends that the most distinctive feature 
of any transcendental analysis of the possibility of religious experience 
is a kind of fourth employment of reason that is more ontologically 
robust than the others, dealing with the over-plus of meaning that eludes 
technical reason.
It should be noted that Otto is not strictly speaking a Kant 
exegete, but  an  innovator who  extends Kant’s critical philosophy to 
the religious dimension of human experience. This religious perspective 
or, as Otto refers to it, the “religious outlook” is the key link among the 
works of Palmquist, Otto, and Tillich. Although Tillich uses the term 
“ontological reason” to describe the point of contact between rea- son 
and reality, the way it functions in his system is very similar to Otto’s 
“faculty of divination” or Palmquist’s “Transcendental Perspective.” 
For Tillich, “Neither structures, Gestalt processes, values, nor meanings 
can be grasped without ontological reason. Technical reason can reduce 
them to something less than their true reality.”20 Technical reason (or 
reason in its three finite standpoints) can give a limited description of 
religion, but ontological reason enables us to grasp its true essence. 
All three of these thinkers—Palmquist, Otto, and Tillich— understand 
the religious dimension, outlook, or perspective not only as the natural 
fourth step for philosophy, but also as a particularly vital aspect of 
reason’s overarching economy.21
19  Stephen R. Palmquist, “Kant’s Critique of Mysticism: (2) The Critical Mysticism,” Phi-
losophy and Theology, vol. 4, 11, 83. Emphases mine.
20  Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.1, 81.
21  Otto remarks in a footnote, “constructing a ‘humanity’ prior to and apart from the most 
central and potent of human capacities is like nothing so much as the attempt to frame a 
standard idea of the human body after having previously cut off the head.” Rudolf Otto, 
The Idea of the Holy (London: Oxford University Press, 1931), 37, f2.
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Ontological reason (or the Transcendental Perspective) serves as 
the primary link between philosophy and theology in both Palmquist’s 
interpretation and Tillich’s theology. Without a proper understanding 
of ontological reason, technical reason is corrupted and religion is 
reduced.22 Internal to Tillich’s understanding of ontology is a definite 
position on the relationship between philosophy and theology. Like 
Palmquist’s interpretation of Kant, it has an hourglass-shaped structure. 
This hourglass integrates three principal aspects of reality—God, man, 
and world. Kant repeats over and again a similar three-fold structure in 
the Opus Posthumum as if he were proleptically groping his way toward 
Tillich: philosophy fundamentally works from the perspective of reason 
(logos) and the man-world relationship and theology fundamentally 
works from the perspective of faith in revelation (Logos, the Word of 
God) and the God-man relationship, with the method of correlation 
integrating them into a sys- tem. 23
In conclusion, I have shown, through two of Tillich’s lesser-known 
writings—the newspaper review articles on the person and work of 
Rudolf Otto—that Otto greatly influenced Tillich at a formative stage in 
his intellectual development and that several key elements of Tillich’s 
mature thought are found in Tillich’s analysis of Otto. I also have 
shown, in reference to the interpretations of Caird and Palmquist, 
that Otto’s philosophy of religion can be fruitfully understood as a 
direct extension  of Kant’s  critical philosophy. Furthermore, I have 
shown how the superstructure of Tillich’s theology bears a striking 
resemblance to Kant’s philosophy in the sense of Caird, Otto, and 
Palmquist. Tillich, in essence, formulates in theological terms a new and 
improved extension of Kant’s philosophical program as it pertains to 
religion. The cumulative force of my argument supports the conclusions 
that Kant’s philosophy through Otto has “constitutive significance” 
for Tillich’s thought and, insofar as this analysis is accurate, Tillich’s 
systematic theology is as much grounded on the philosophy of Kant as 
it is on the philosophy of Schelling.
22  Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.1, 81. For Tillich, philosophy may sometimes function 
as though technical reason and ontological reason are not divided, but they are so divis-
ible and theology itself must reject the confusion of this division. Tillich, Systematic 
Theology, vol.1, 82.
23  As Kant puts it in fragment form in the Opus Postumum, “Three principles: God, the 
world, and the concept of the subject which unites them and brings synthetic unity into 
these concepts (a priori) insofar as reason makes this transcendental unity itself” (21:23).
